

# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓		
2	DDCI		✓		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS		✓		
5	DDP		✓		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt	DDT for ES			
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	MO/SP		✓		
20	C/ACIS		✓		
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

Executive Secretary

Date

3637 (10-81)

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Executive Registry

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## UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

July 31, 1984

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Space Arms Control

While we have taken several initiatives in START, INF, CW, and MBFR, so far we have made no specific proposals on space arms control. We have gained ground with your June 29 statement announcing, among other things, our willingness to discuss space arms control with the Soviets without preconditions. I believe we should follow up by directing our strategy toward a concrete proposal consistent with our security interests.

Based on studies to date, I recommend that we pursue an agreement to prohibit attacks on satellites and to regulate certain space activities. This "Incidents in Space" proposal would be similar to our Incidents at Sea agreement with the Soviet Union. Such an agreement would:

- o raise the threshold for Soviet attacks on satellites;
- o enhance stability by reducing the possibilities for misunderstandings regarding space activities;
- o demonstrate U.S. seriousness on space arms control and improve our position internationally and domestically;
- o help deflect measures proposed in the Congress, such as a test moratorium and unverifiable comprehensive bans; and
- o not interfere with, and possibly help secure support for, SDI and ASAT programs and give us time to better define these programs and their arms control implications.

Such an agreement would also pick up on one of the major parts of the 1978-79 ASAT negotiations with the Soviets. It would not, however, pick up on the part for a test moratorium. I believe we should not subscribe to a test moratorium on our ASAT system as this would be a reversal of position for the Administration and thus undercut the credibility of our March 31 report and our supporters in Congress.

At the same time, if we wish to move on some further limit, you could declare that as a matter of national policy we will not test our interceptor against high-altitude space objects as long as other nations exercise similar restraint. This declaratory statement would not cause problems for SDI.

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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REG

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
Some will criticize these initiatives as cosmetic and as placing no real restrictions on ASATs. But I believe these steps have merit and can contribute to stability without imposing restrictions that would adversely impact on SDI.

In contrast, a high-altitude ban that includes low-altitude constraints, options limiting each side to its current low-altitude system, or a ban on all ASAT interceptors could block technology development for near-term SDI options. We do not now know if this technology can be developed in ways consistent with further ASAT limits. Of course, any such development must also be consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty.

Some may argue that we can avoid adverse impacts on SDI by limiting the duration of any agreement. I believe that that approach still puts our SDI options at risk since pressures would mount to extend the agreement and planning and funding would be shaped by treaty constraints.

In the longer term, I would favor further initiatives, as long as they are sufficiently verifiable and consistent with our interests. At this stage, however, more study is needed.

In sum, I believe we need to be ready with an "Incidents in Space" initiative in hand and, as a contingency, a policy statement on our willingness not to test our interceptor against space objects at high-altitude if others show similar restraint. If the Soviets refuse to come to Vienna, we should pursue these initiatives in other ways.



David F. Emery  
Acting

cc: Honorable George Shultz  
Honorable Caspar Weinberger  
Honorable William Casey  
General John Vessey

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